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Secondary Boycotts and the First
Amendment
Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA)1 makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to
"threaten, coerce, or restrain any person" with the object of requir-
ing that person to cease dealing with another.2 In NLRB v. Retail
Store Employees Union Local 1001 (Safeco),3 the Supreme Court
held that this section proscribes union picketing designed to influ-
ence consumers to boycott a struck product whenever such picket-
ing "reasonably can be expected to threaten [the picketed retailer]
with ruin or substantial loss."'4 Although the Court noted in pass-
ing that peaceful picketing is entitled to some first amendment
protection, the Court found it "well-established" that Congress
had constitutional power to prohibit "picketing that predictably
encourages consumers to boycott a secondary business."5
Recent commentators have argued that the "ruin or substan-
1 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1982).
2 The section reads in pertinent part-
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-
(4) . (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in
an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is-
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, trans-
porting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, proces-
sor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person, ...
Provided, That nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to
make unlawful... any primary strike or primary picketing,
... Provided further, That ... nothing contained in [this] paragraph shall be
construed to prohibit publicity, other than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully
advising the public, including consumers and members of a labor organization,
that a product or products are produced by an employer with whom the labor
organization has a primary dispute and are distributed by another employer ....
3 447 U.S. 607 (1980).
4 Id. at 614.
5 Id. at 616.
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tial loss" test of Safeco is premised on an invalid distinction be-
tween labor-related consumer picketing and other forms of speech
that are constitutionally protected. These criticisms have assumed
particular force in light of the Court's subsequent application of a
more protective test for political secondary boycotts outside the la-
bor context. This comment argues that differing tests for labor
and political secondary boycotts are undesirable in that contempo-
rary first amendment doctrine provides a consistent framework for
analyzing all secondary boycotts. The comment initially examines
the basic structure of secondary boycotts and the courts' treat-
ments of such boycotts under the first amendment. The comment
then delineates a first amendment framework that requires courts
faced with a secondary boycott case to engage in a two-step analy-
sis. First, a court must ask whether the activities of those individu-
als advocating the boycott affect the advocate's listeners through
persuasion or through coercion. If the activities are coercive, the
boycott is unprotected. If the activities are persuasive, a court
must proceed to the second step of the analysis, and determine
whether there are substantial state interests sufficient to support
incidental restrictions on the speech elements of the boycott under
United States v. O'Brien."
Using this framework, the comment examines the state inter-
ests in regulating both primary and secondary boycotts, and con-
6 See, e.g., Note, Peaceful Labor Picketing and the First Amendment, 82 COLuM. L.
REv. 1469, 1497 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, Peaceful Labor Picketing] (first amend-
ment doctrines applied to labor picketing are sui generis and designed to protect business
property interests); Note, Labor Picketing and Commercial Speech: Free Enterprise Values
in the Doctrine of Free Speech, 91 YAmE L.J. 938, 939 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Labor Picketing and Commercial Speech] (disguised economic policy judgments underlie
Court's inconsistent first amendment treatment of labor picketing and commercial speech);
see also Note, Secondary Consumer Picketing, Statutory Interpretation and the First
Amendment, 81 MiCH. L. REv. 1817, 1821 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, Secondary Con-
sumer Picketing] (arguing that Safeco test fails to assess realistically the purposes and im-
pact of secondary consumer picketing).
Compare NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (political boycott of
white merchants by black citizens to compel legislative change held constitutionally pro-
tected), with International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. 'Allied Int'l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 226
(1982) (secondary boycott by labor union not protected activity). The Court in Claiborne
Hardware briefly alluded to the distinction: "While States have broad power to regulate
economic activity, we do not find a comparable right to prohibit peaceful political activity
such as that found in the boycott in this case." 458 U.S. at 913.
8 391 U.S. 367 (1968). O'Brien held that draft card burning was not a constitutionally
protected activity. In reaching its conclusion, the Court held that government regulation of
activities involving both "speech" and "nonspeech" elements may be constitutionally upheld
if the regulation furthers a substantial state interest unrelated to the suppression of free
expression and if the incidental restriction on freedom of speech is "no greater than is es-
sential to the furtherance of that interest." Id. at 377.
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eludes that the extent to which a secondary party is economically
independent of the primary party, or "neutral," is the key consid-
eration in determining whether a state may constitutionally re-
strict a union's right to engage in secondary picketing. The com-
ment then briefly compares the interests at stake in political and
labor boycotts, and concludes that political boycotts are afforded
greater protection than labor boycotts because in a political boy-
cott the secondary target-the government's constituency-is al-
ways allied, politically, with the primary party, the targeted
government.
I. BACKGROUND
A boycott may generally be defined as the withholding of so-
cial or business intercourse to express disapproval or to apply eco-
nomic pressure.9 In a primary boycott, one party to a dispute, the
boycott advocate, exerts economic pressure directly against his op-
ponent in an effort to force the latter to accede to the former's
demands. A secondary boycott adds another level of compulsion: to
influence the "primary" opponent, the boycott advocate exerts eco-
nomic or social pressure against persons who deal with the primary
party so that they will join the boycott advocate's cause.'0 In the
case of a labor dispute, the employees, usually through their union,
may rely on their own economic power to influence the secondary
party,"" may urge the secondary party's employees to engage in a
partial work stoppage,' 2 or may appeal to customers of the secon-
WansiaaRs THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 264 (P. Gove ed. 1961).
10 Learned Hand provided one of the best definitions of a secondary boycott in Interna-
tional Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 501 v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341
U.S. 694 (1951):
The gravamen of a secondary boycott is that its sanctions bear, not upon the employer
who alone is a party to the dispute, but upon some third party who has no concern in
it. Its aim is to compel him to stop business with the employer in the hope that this
will induce the employer to give in to his employees' demands.
" See, e.g., International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212 (1982)
(longshoremen refused to unload goods belonging to secondary targets, American compa-
nies, who dealt with primary target, the Soviet Union); Douds v. Milk Drivers Union Local
584, 154 F. Supp. 222 (S.D.N.Y.) (one group of milk dealers refused to bottle milk for an-
other group of dealers who would not enforce "hot cargo" agreement against a third group),
aff'd, 248 F.2d 534 (2d Cir. 1957).
12 See, e.g., International Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 501 v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694
(1951) (electricians' union picketed to encourage employees of carpentry subcontractor to
engage in work stoppage, thereby coercing subcontractor to pressure the general contractor
to hire union labor); NLRB v. International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 182, 272 F.2d 85 (2d
Cir. 1959) (union picketed secondary target's premises in effort to induce target's employees
to refuse to handle deliveries from primary employer).
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dary party to cease or curtail their patronage.1" This comment fo-
cuses primarily on the last of these methods of engaging in a sec-
ondary boycott and refers to those who appeal to the secondary
target's customers as "boycott advocates."
Secondary boycotts need not be labor-related. Political boy-
cotts, for example, are secondary in nature when an aggrieved po-
litical group applies economic pressure against other citizens to se-
cure the latter's aid in petitioning the government to pass new
legislation. 4
In both the political and labor contexts, secondary boycotts
typically involve several forms of communicative and noncom-
municative behavior. Through picketing, speech, and dissemina-
tion of literature, the boycott advocates seek to publicize their dis-
pute with the primary target and to garner public support for their
position.15 The boycott advocates hope that any consequent public
withdrawal of patronage from the secondary target will demon-
strate to him the strength of the public's support, and will thereby
cause him to boycott the primary party as well. A necessary effect
of the public's withdrawal of patronage, however, is an immediate
injury to the secondary target, accompanied by the message that
"punishment will cease if enough concessions are granted. 16
At common law, the term "secondary," as applied to labor
boycotts, "operated essentially as a synonym for illegality,"1' 7 since
courts treated the pressure brought to bear on the secondary party
as coercive. 8 Courts routinely issued injunctions to bar deliberate
'3 See, e.g., NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union Local 1001 (Safeco), 447 U.S. 607
(1980) (employees of primary target, through picketing, urged secondary target's consumers
not to buy primary's insurance policies); NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760
(Tree Fruits), 377 U.S. 58 (1964) (employees of primary target urged customers of secondary
target, a grocery chain, not to buy apples produced by primary target).
14 See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (NAACP advo-
cated economic boycott of white merchants by black citizens to pressure merchants, as civic
and business leaders, into petitioning the government to pass legislation on issues of racial
equality); Missouri v. National Org. for Women, 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.) (National Organi-
zation of Women organized convention boycott of states that had not ratified equal rights
amendment to secure citizens' aid in pressuring state legislatures to pass the amendment),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980).
15 See Note, Secondary Consumer Picketing, supra note 6, at 1826.
16 F. HAmAN, SPEECH AND LAW IN A FREE SocIrY 238 (1981).
27 B. MELTzER, LABoR LAW: CASES, MATERLS, AND PROBLEMS 443 (2d ed. 1977); see
also Barnard & Graham, Labor and the Secondary Boycott, 15 WASH. L. Rlv. 137, 139
(1940) ("[iun judicial calculus 'secondary boycott' equals illegality"); Hellerstein, Secondary
Boycotts in Labor Disputes, 47 YALE L.J. 341,.341-42 (1938) (secondary boycott a "loose
and uncertain label used by courts indiscriminately to condemn a wide variety of labor's
activities").
"S The Supreme Court, for example, defined "secondary boycott" as
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extensions of labor pressures from the employer with whom the
union had a dispute, the primary target, to other employers having
business relations with the primary target.19
This situation changed dramatically with the New Deal labor
legislation of the 1930's. The Norris-LaGuardia Act of 193220 for-
bade the courts to interfere with peaceful labor activity, including
secondary boycotts.21 Abusive union conduct was not prohibited,
and strong unions were able to use secondary boycotts as tools for
gaining economic benefits for their members or forcing employers
to recognize unions even when they lacked sufficient employee sup-
port for legally mandated recognition.2
In 1947, Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act,23 which gave
the National Labor Relations Board jurisdiction to enjoin unfair
labor practices by unions as well as employers.2 ' Section 8(b)(4)(A)
of the Taft-Hartley Act amended the NLRA to make it an unfair
labor practice for a labor organization to engage in, or to encourage
the employees of any employer to engage in, a strike or concerted
work stoppage where the object of that strike or work stoppage was
to force or require any employer or self-employed person to cease
doing business with any other person.25 The legislative history
a combination not merely to refrain from dealing with complainant, or to advise or by
peaceful means persuade complainant's customers to refrain ("primary boycott"), but
to exercise coercive pressure upon such customers.. . to cause them to withhold or
withdraw patronage from complainant through fear of loss or damage to themselves
should they deal with it.
Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 466 (1921); see also Barnard & Graham,
supra note 17, at 140 n.13 (citing cases).
1" B. MELrzE, supra note 17, at 443.
20 Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 101-115 (1982)).
I1 rd. § 4, 47 Stat. 70 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1982)); see H. NORTHRUP
& G. BLOOM, GOVERNMENT AND LABOR 24 (1963).
R. DEEmsHINSKY, A. BERKOWrrz & P. MxscupmARA, THE NLRB AND SECONDARY Boy-
corS 3 (rev. ed. 1981).
"I Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1982)).
29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1982).
15 Section 8(b)(4)(A) originally read, in pertinent part, as follows:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-
(4) to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to en-
gage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to...
handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any
services, where an object thereof is:
(A) forcing or requiring ... any employer or other person to cease using,
selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any
other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with
any other person.
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makes clear that this provision was intended to outlaw secondary
boycotts aimed at the business of third parties "wholly uncon-
cerned" with the disagreement between the union and the primary
employer.28 In 1959, Congress passed the Landrum-Griflin Act" to
close perceived loopholes in section 8(b)(4)(A). 28 The new secon-
dary boycott provision was incorporated in section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B).29
II. JuDIcIAL ANALYSIS OF SECONDARY BOYCOTTS UNDER THE FmsT
AMENDMENT
A. Primary Labor Picketing Under the First Amendment
Constitutional protection was first extended to primary peace-
ful labor picketing in the 1940 Supreme Court decision of Thorn-
hill v. Alabama.0 The petitioner in Thornhill had been convicted
under an Alabama anti-picketing statute that made it a misde-
meanor to loiter or picket the worksite of another in order to in-
duce third parties to withhold their business."' The Court held the
statute invalid on its face as a violation of the right of free speech.
After noting that "[f]ree discussion concerning the conditions in
industry and the causes of labor disputes [is] indispensable to the
effective and intelligent use of the processes of popular government
to shape the destiny of modern industrial society,"32 the Court
ruled that Alabama could not enjoin labor picketing except "where
the clear danger of substantive evils arises under circumstances af-
fording no opportunity to test the merits of ideas by competition
for acceptance in the market of public opinion.""3
Id. § 8(b)(4)(A) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1982)).
26 93 CONG. REC. 4198 (statement of Sen. Taft), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATivE
HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 1106 (1948).
27 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-Griffin Act),
Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 158-160, 164, 186,
187, 401-531 (1982)).
2See National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 633 (1967) ("The Lan-
drum-Griffin Act amendments in 1959 were adopted only to close various loopholes in the
application of § 8(b)(4)(A) which had been exposed in Board and court decisions.").
29 29 U.S.C. § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1982), quoted in pertinent part supra note 2.
310 U.S. 88 (1940).
" Id. at 91.
3 Id. at 103.
33 Id. at 104-05. The Court's language suggests the "clear and present danger" test for
protection of speech that evolved from Justice Holmes's famous opinion in Schenck v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). Cf. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375, 377
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("[D]iscussion affords ordinarily adequate protection
against the dissemination of noxious doctrine .... If there be time to expose through dis-
cussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the rem-
edy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence. Only an emergency can justify re-
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Thornhill established that state power "to set the limits of
permissible contest open to industrial combatants" would be sub-
jected to constitutional scrutiny whenever "the effective exercise of
the right to discuss freely industrial relations" might be im-
paired.34 One year later, in AFL v. Swing,35 the Court relied on
Thornhill to hold that a state could not bar workers from picket-
ing a non-union employer solely on the ground that the employer's
own employees were not parties to the dispute. The Court's broad
language suggested that secondary, as well as primary, picketing
merited constitutional protection:
The interdependence of economic interest of all engaged in
the same industry has become a commonplace. The right of
free communication cannot therefore be mutilated by denying
it to workers, in a dispute with an employer, even though they
are not in his employ. Communication by such employees of
the facts of a dispute, deemed by them to be relevant to their
interests, can no more be barred because of concern for the
economic interests against which they are seeking to enlist
public opinion than could the utterance protected in Thorn-
hill's case."
The broad first amendment protection of picketing recognized
in Thornhill and Swing was soon restricted. In Giboney v. Empire
Storage & Ice Co.,3 7 a union that represented retail ice peddlers
picketed a wholesale ice dealer, seeking to obtain an agreement by
the dealer not to sell to non-union peddlers.8 The Missouri courts,
finding that such an agreement would constitute a conspiracy in
restraint of trade, enjoined the picketing. 9 The Supreme Court re-
jected the union's claim that the injunction was in violation of the
first amendment, and found Thornhill inapplicable where the
picketing was part of a "single and integrated course of conduct
. .. in violation of a valid criminal statute. 40 The Court suggested
that picketing could not be separated into illegal and legal compo-
nents when its "sole, unlawful immediate objective" was to force
pressions."). For a recent discussion of the evolution of the "clear and present danger" test,
see Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. Cm. L. REv. 1207
(1983).
3 310 U.S. at 104.
" 312 U.S. 321 (1941).
34 Id. at 326 (citations omitted).
-7 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
3 Id. at 492.
31 Id. at 494.
40 Id. at 498.
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the wholesaler to acquiesce in a restraint of trade.41
In several subsequent cases, the Court generalized the "inte-
grated course of conduct" rationale announced in Giboney and
permitted states to prohibit any picketing that had an "unlawful
objective" 42 or was designed to induce action "counter to valid
state policy. '43 The Court repeatedly emphasized that peaceful
picketing "involved more than just communication of ideas and
could not be immune from all state regulation."44 Moreover, the
Court implied that picketing necessarily involved coercive ele-
ments "irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are being dis-
seminated. '45 Despite the admixture of notions of "unlawful objec-
tive," "valid state policy," and inherent coerciveness, it is clear
that the Court's post-Giboney cases represented a relaxation of the
"clear danger" standard of Thornhill46 and gave substantially
greater latitude to state and federal prohibitions on picketing. The
Court upheld state injunctions against picketing whose goals con-
flicted with such state policies as nondiscrimination in hiring,4
promotion of self-employment,4" freedom to hire non-union em-
ployees, 49 and the prevention of a union's coercion of employer
support for that union in a representation election.50 Because the
41 Id. at 502.
42 See Building Serv. Employees Union Int'l Local 262 v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532, 539
(1950) ("unlawful objective" held to be an adequate basis for enjoining picketing); see also
International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 309 v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 478-79 (1950) ("[W]e
cannot conclude that [the state of] Washington, in holding the picketing in these cases to be
for an unlawful object, has struck a balance so inconsistent with rooted traditions of a free
people that it must be found an unconstitutional choice.").
43 International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 291 (1957)
("The implied reassessments of the broad language of the Thornhill case were finally gener-
alized in a series of cases sustaining injunctions against peaceful picketing ... when such
picketing was counter to valid state policy in a domain open to state regulation.").
4 Id. at 289. See also Bakery Drivers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776-77 (1942);
Carpenters Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722, 725-28 (1941).
46 Bakery & Pastry Drivers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776 (1942) (Douglas, J.,
concurring); see also Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 468 (1950) (referring to "the
compulsive features inherent in picketing, beyond the aspect of mere communication as an
appeal to reason").
4' See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
47 Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 468 (1950) (picketing to compel grocery
store owner to hire black clerks held to violate state anti-discrimination policy and therefore
may be enjoined).
48 International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 309 v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 480 (1950) (pick-
eting to compel sole owner-operator to open a union shop may be enjoined).
49 Local 10, United Ass'n of Journeymen Plumbers v. Graham, 345 U.S. 192, 200-01
(1953) (picketing to enforce union shop may be enjoined since contrary to state right-to-
work law).
'1 International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 294 (1957)
(upholding injunction of picketing designed "to coerce the employer to put pressure on his
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Court consistently deferred to state courts' articulations of their
own state's public policy, 1 the states were in effect left free to en-
join all peaceful picketing "by the simple device of declaring union
objectives contrary to public policy."5
B. Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) and the First Amendment
The language of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) does not forbid all sec-
ondary picketing.53 Rather, the statute makes it unlawful for a
union to "threaten, coerce or restrain any person" with the object
of requiring him "to cease doing business with any other person. ' ' 4
Limiting provisions make clear that the clause does not proscribe
otherwise lawful primary picketing 55 and does not reach "publicity,
other than picketing" except in limited circumstances.58 As the au-
employees to join the union, in violation of the declared policy of the state"); Building Serv.
Employees Int'l Union Local 262 v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532, 539 (1950) (upholding injunction
of picketing whose objective was to secure "coercion by the employer of the employees' se-
lection of a bargaining representative").
51 See International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc. 354 U.S. 284, 296 (1957)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court for letting state courts' determinations of ilMe-
gality be conclusive); International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 309 v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470,
478-79 (1950) (deferring to state court view that picketing to compel compliance with de-
mand for a union shop has an unlawful objective); Building Serv. Employees Int'l Union
Local 262 v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. at 532, 540 (1950) (whether union picketing to further objec-
tives in violation of state policy may be prohibited does not depend on whether the state
provides criminal sanctions to promote the policy).
52 Fraenkel, Peaceful Picketing-Constitutionally Protected?, 99 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 12
(1950).
53 In Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 98 (1958), the Court
stated:
Whatever may have been said in Congress preceding the passage of the Taft-Hartley
Act concerning the evil of all forms of "secondary boycotts" and the desirability of
outlawing them, it is clear that no such sweeping prohibition was in fact enacted in
§ 8(b)(4)(A) [the precursor to current § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)]. The section does not speak
generally of secondary boycotts. It describes and condemns specific union conduct di-
rected to specific objectives.
See also NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 760 (Tree Fruits), 377 U.S. 58, 62-63
(1964) (reaching the same conclusion with regard to the section (now renumbered
§ 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)) after its amendment by the Landrum-Griffin Act, Pub. L. No. 86-257,
§ 704(a), 73 Stat. 519, 542-43 (1959) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B)
(1982)).
" NLRA § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1982).
55 Id. ("[Niothing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful,
where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing.")
NLRA § 8(b), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1982) ("[N]othing contained in [paragraph 4] shall
be construed to prohibit publicity, other than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully advis-
ing the public, including consumers and members of a labor organization, that a product or
products are produced by an employer with whom the labor organization has a primary
dispute and are distributed by another employer, as long as such publicity does not have an
effect of inducing any individual employed by any person other than the primary employer
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thors of one recent commentary have noted, section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)
"was written with the constitutional distinctions between picketing
and publicity in mind. '57
In NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760 (Tree
Fruits),58 the Supreme Court relied on both congressional policy
and the constitutional clear statement doctrine 9 to hold that sec-
tion 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) did not condemn secondary picketing of retail
groceries that was directed solely at persuading customers not to
purchase apples packed by non-union firms. The Court noted that
Congress had consistently refused to prohibit peaceful picketing
except where necessary to prevent "clearly identified abuses" of
such picketing,60 and had expressed its concern that a "broad ban
against peaceful picketing might collide with the guarantees of the
First Amendment."61 Accordingly, the Court rejected the view that
Congress had determined all peaceful picketing at secondary sites
to be "necessarily" coercive within the meaning of the Act.6 2
Tree Fruits drew a sharp distinction between picketing "di-
rected only at the struck product""e and picketing intended "to
shut off all trade with the secondary employer unless he aids the
union in its [primary] dispute."" In NLRB v. Retail Store Em-
ployees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco),15 the Supreme Court modified
this distinction and held that secondary picketing directed solely
at the struck product nonetheless violates section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)
where it "reasonably can be expected to threaten neutral parties
with ruin or substantial loss."6 Safeco thus limited the protection
afforded to secondary picketing under Tree Fruits to situations
in the course of his employment to refuse to pick up, deliver, or transport any goods, or not
to perform any services, at the establishment of the employer engaged in such
distribution.").
7 R. DFRSHINSKY, A. BERKowrrz & P. MIscatARRA, supra note 22, at 231.
55 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
59 Under the "clear statement" model of statutory interpretation, the Court will inter-
pret narrowly all legislation or grants of authority that curtail constitutionally protected
rights so as to preserve the legislation's constitutionality. See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116,
129 (1958); Note, Intent, Clear Statements and the Common Law: Statutory Interpreta-
tion in the Supreme Court, 95 H-Rv. L. Rv. 892, 908-10 (1982). This principle was re-
flected in the reluctance of the Tree Fruits Court to "ascribe" to Congress an intent to
proscribe all secondary site picketing given that such a broad ban "might collide with the
guarantees of the First Amendment." 377 U.S. at 63.
:0 Id. at 67; see also id. at 62-63.
1 Id. at 63.
42 Id. at 64.
63 Id. at 65.
. Id. at 70.
e 447 U.S. 607 (1980).
Id. at 614.
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where the picketed product is but one among many comprising the
secondary target's trade.6 7 Four of the justices on the Safeco Court
summarily dismissed any first amendment objections, noting that
union picketing that "predictably encourages consumers to boycott
a secondary business" necessarily coerces the secondary business to
align with the union, and therefore may be constitutionally re-
stricted on the basis of its unlawful objectives.6 8
C. Political Secondary Boycotts
In NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 9 a unanimous Court
indicated that secondary boycotts to achieve governmental change,
unlike secondary boycotts for economic objectives in a labor con-
text, are entitled to broad first amendment protection." Claiborne
Hardware concerned a boycott of white merchants by black citi-
zens who sought racial equality in economic and political affairs.
The Mississippi Supreme Court, finding that some of the boycott
advocates had used force, violence, and threats to promote the
boycott, held the entire boycott unlawful and the NAACP, its prin-
cipal organizer, liable for all lost earnings incurred by the
merchants due to the boycott.7 1 The Supreme Court reversed. Rea-
soning that the boycott involved constitutionally protected rights
of speech, assembly, association, and petition, the Court held that
"[tihe right of the [s]tates to regulate economic activity could not
justify a complete prohibition against [such] a non-violent, politi-
cally motivated boycott. ' 7 2 The Court acknowledged that any vio-
67 Id. at 613. For an argument that this was indeed Congress's intent, see Comment,
Consumer Picketing and the Single-Product Secondary Employer, 47 U. Cm. L. Rzv. 112,
120-24 (1979).
" 447 U.S. at 616. The portion of Justice Powell's opinion rejecting the union's first
amendment claims was joined only by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Rehn-
quist. Justice Blackmun criticized the majority for its "cursory discussion of ... difficult
First Amendment issues," id. (Blackmun, J., concurring), but nonetheless felt "reluctant to
hold unconstitutional Congress' striking of the delicate balance between union freedom of
expression and the ability of neutral employers, employees, and consumers to remain free
from coerced participation in industrial strife." Id. at 617-18. In a similar vein, Justice Ste-
vens criticized the plurality for glossing over the awkward fact that the regulation of expres-
sion at issue in Safeco was "predicated squarely on its content." Id. at 618 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). Justice Stevens, however, viewed the statutory ban as regulating only the coer-
cive aspect of the picketing, i.e., "only that aspect of the union's efforts to communicate its
views that calls for an automatic reponse to a signal, rather than a reasoned response to an
idea." Id. at 619.
69 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
70 Id. at 912-13.
71 See id. at 895 (discussing the state court holding).
72 Id. at 914.
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lent conduct was, of course, unprotected 7s but stated that the im-
position of liability on the NAACP without any finding that it had
actually, or even apparently, ratified that conduct would "imper-
missibly burden" constitutionally protected rights of political
association. 4
The Court's analysis of the boycott in Claiborne Hardware
differed from its analysis of labor boycotts in three significant re-
spects. First, the Court rejected any argument that the boycott lost
its protected character because it was intended to coerce.75 Thus,
the Court left little doubt that the Safeco "ruin or substantial
loss" test was constitutionally insufficient in the context of politi-
cal boycotts. Second, by finding the agreement to act in concert to
be itself constitutionally protected,7 6 the Court implicitly rejected
the notion, familiar in its labor cases, that the essential nature of
boycotting or picketing activity imperceptibly shifts from speech to
action as the number of participants and their degree of organiza-
tion increases.7 7 Finally, the Court rejected the claim that the oc-
currence of violent acts in conjunction with a boycott is sufficient
to condemn it unless "fear rather than protected conduct was the
dominant force" in the boycott's success.7
III. FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
In Claiborne Hardware, the Court gave little justification for
73 Id. at 933.
74 Id. at 931.
75 Compare id. at 910-11 with International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'l, Inc.,
456 U.S. 212, 226 (1982) (summarily noting, in the context of a politically motivated secon-
dary labor boycott, that "conduct designed not to communicate but to coerce merits [little]
consideration under the First Amendment").
76" , '[Tlhe practice of persons sharing common views banding together to achieve a
common end is deeply embedded in the American political process.'" 458 U.S. at 907 (quot-
ing Citizens Against Rent Control Coalition for Fair Housing v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 294
(1981)).
77 See, for example, the statement of the Court in Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range
Co., 221 U.S. 418, 439 (1911):
[T]he agreement to act in concert when the signal is published, gives the words "Un-
fair," "We don't patronize," or similar expressions, a force not inhering in the words
themselves, and therefore exceeding any possible right of free speech which a single
individual might have. Under such circumstances they become what have been called
"verbal acts," and as much subject to injunction as the use of any other force whereby
property is unlawfully damaged.
See also Safeco, 447 U.S. at 619 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that, in the labor context,
"the conduct element rather than the particular idea being expressed ... provides the most
persuasive deterrent to third persons about to enter a business establishment" and that that
aspect of the picketing makes it subject to restrictive regulations).
78 Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 934.
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treating labor and political boycotts separately except by way of a
negative inference from its statement that political speech has al-
ways "rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amend-
ment values. '7  Recent commentators have argued persuasively,
however, that speech on labor issues extends beyond matters of
merely commercial interest and involves fundamental public con-
cerns.80 As the Court itself noted in Thornhill, "[f]ree discussion
concerning the conditions in industry and the causes of labor dis-
putes appears ... indispensable to the effective and intelligent use
of the processes of popular government to shape the destiny of
modern industrial society."81 Because secondary consumer boy-
cotts often play a crucial role in disseminating information about
labor disputes, 2 they merit the same first amendment protection
as the political boycott in Claiborne Hardware. Building on these
conclusions of earlier commentators, this section of the comment
attempts to articulate a common framework for both labor and po-
litical secondary boycotts.
A. Overview of the Analysis
As noted earlier, the Supreme Court has developed two pri-
mary justifications for state regulation of the right to picket: first,
picketing involves coercive effects that are independent of its com-
municative aspects; 83 and second, picketing involves conduct as
well as speech, and is therefore subject to legislative control."
79 Id. at 913 (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980)). In Connick v. Myers,
103 S. Ct. 1684 (1983), the Court reiterated its view that public-issue speech is entitled to
special first amendment protection. There the Court held that a public employee could be
discharged for circulating a questionnaire on matters not of public interest. The Court made
clear, however, that had the employee spoken "as a citizen on matters of public concern,"
the discharge would have been unlawful:
[t]he First Amendment "was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for
the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people." . ..
"[S]peech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of
self-government.". . . Accordingly, the Court has frequently reaffirmed that speech on
public issues occupies the "highest rung of the heirarchy [sic] of First Amendment
values," and is entitled to special protection.
Id. at 1689 (citations omitted).
so See, e.g., Note, Peaceful Labor Picketing, supra note 6, at 1486; Note, Labor Picket-
ing and Commercial Speech, supra note 6, at 955.
s1 310 U.S. at 103.
81 See Note, Secondary Consumer Picketing, supra note 6, at 1826.
88 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
See supra note 44 and accompanying text; see also NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable
Packers Local 760 (Tree Fruits), 377 U.S. 58, 77 (1964) (Black, J., concurring) (" 'Picketing'
[normally includes] two concepts: (1) patrolling, that is, standing or marching back and
forth... ; [and] (2) speech, that is, arguments, usually on a placard, made to persuade
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Neither of these rationales suffices to support a per se ban on all
secondary boycotts that threaten the secondary target with sub-
stantial economic loss. In Claiborne Hardware, the fact that the
boycott had a substantial economic impact on the boycotted
merchants did not render the boycott subject to state prohibition
absent further findings that fear of reprisal was the "dominant
force" behind public support of the boycott.8 5 Similarly, the mere
fact that picketing involves both conduct and speech does not
render the first amendment irrelevant. As the Court held in
United States v. O'Brien,s6 communicative conduct is protected by
the first amendment; state regulation of such conduct is permitted
only when it furthers a substantial governmental interest "unre-
lated to the suppression of free expression" and involves no greater
restriction on first amendment rights than is essential to the fur-
therance of that interest.87
Secondary boycotts involve both speech and nonspeech ele-
ments, and should therefore be subject to the O'Brien test. Yet
proper first amendment analysis of such boycotts requires a pre-
liminary determination of whether the speech element of the boy-
cott is predominantly persuasive or predominantly coercive, for
only if it is predominantly persuasive is it entitled to first amend-
ment protection at all.88 Boycotts that are predominantly coercive
may be regulated freely while those that are predominantly per-
suasive may, under O'Brien, be regulated only to protect a compel-
ling state interest and only by the least restrictive means necessary
to protect that interest.8 9 In the case of most regulation of second-
ary boycotts, the state's interest is protecting secondary targets
from economic loss.9" Thus, both the preliminary determination
other people to take the picketers' side of a controversy... [P]atrolling is, of course, con-
duct, not speech, and therefore is not directly protected by the First Amendment.").
8" 458 U.S. at 934. Cf. NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union Local 1001 (Safeco), 447
U.S. 607, 614, 616 (Secondary picketing that "reasonably can be expected to threaten neu-
tral parties with ruin or substantial loss... spreads labor discord by coercing a neutral
party to join the fray" and may therefore be constitutionally prohibited.).
88 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
Id. at 377.
88 See infra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
88 O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
80 See 93 CONG. REc. 4198 (statement of Sen. Taft), reprinted in 2 NLRB, supra note
26, at 1106 (1948) (Secondary boycott statute "makes it unlawful to resort to a secondary
boycott to injure the business of a third person who is wholly unconcerned with the agree-
ment between an employer and his employees."); see also Safeco, 447 U.S. at 614-15 (pur-
pose of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) is to protect secondary party from threat of substantial economic
loss); NLRB v. Business Machine and Office Appliance Mechanics Conference Board, Local
459, 228 F.2d 553, 562 (2d Cir. 1955) (Hand, J., concurring) (secondary boycott statute
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and the O'Brien test involve weighing the degree of coercion, ver-
bal and physical or economic, involved in the boycott. Yet the pre-
liminary determination is concerned only with the relationship be-
tween the boycott advocates and those members of the public to
whom they address their appeal; the O'Brien test examines the ec-
onomic impact of the boycotters on the secondary party.
B. Preliminary Inquiry: Persuasion or Coercion
To be protected under the first amendment, the boycott advo-
cates' appeal to their listeners must be persuasive rather than coer-
cive. The distinction is crucial. Persuasive speech has always been
accorded the highest first amendment protection on the theory
that the free flow of ideas is central to our democratic system of
government: "the best test of truth is the power of the thought to
get itself accepted in the competition of the market." '91 By con-
trast, speech that deprives its listeners of freedom of choice, i.e.,
coercive speech, distorts the marketplace of ideas by causing lis-
teners to accept an idea not for its "truth" but to avoid some sanc-
tion.2 Coercive speech also undermines the political process, since
a democratic society depends upon the autonomy of those who
publicly espouse a point of view and of those who listen.93
Despite the fundamentality of the coercion/persuasion distinc-
tion, courts" and commentators 95 have generally failed to define
designed to insulate secondary employers from economic sanctions that are reasonable be-
tween parties to the primary dispute), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 962 (1956).
,1 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
,2 See generally F. HAIMAN, supra note 16, at 209-16.
" Cf. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587-88 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (first amendment guarantee of free speech has "a structural role to play in se-
curing and fostering our republican system of self-government" and therefore requires in-
formed, as well as open, public debate) (emphasis in original); Saxbe v. Washington Post
Co., 417 U.S. 843, 863 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting) (The self-government rationale of the
first amendment "encompass[es] the receipt of information and ideas as well as the right of
free expression.").
14 Common law definitions of "coercion" are overwhelmingly conclusory, defining con-
duct that is "coercive" simply as "wrongful" or "unlawful." See, e.g., Francis Chevrolet Co.
v. General Motors Corp., 602 F.2d 227, 229 (8th Cir. 1979) ("coercion ... implies wrongful
demand") (emphasis in original); General Motors Corp. v. Blevins, 144 F. Supp. 381, 394 (D.
Colo. 1956) (" 'coerce'. . . [means] to compel by threat or other wrongful action") (empha-
sis added); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Devine, 254 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Ky. 1953) ("coercion ex-
ists when one is by the unlawful conduct of another induced to do or perform some act
under circumstances which deprive him of the exercise of his free will") (emphasis added).
" Both immediately before and shortly after Thornhill was decided, a number of law
review articles discussed the common law courts' attempts to grapple with the coercion/
persuasion distinction. See, e.g., Barnard & Graham, supra note 17, at 139-41 (in relying on
the term "coercion" to hold a boycott "illegal," courts have applied a test "which can be and
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the concept of coercion clearly. As noted in one recent book, coer-
cion presents conceptual difficulties for courts because most situa-
tions in which human beings make choices involve "a mix of per-
suasive and coercive elements"; only when our choices have been
reduced to "a sharply limited and unpleasant range of choices" will
coercion be said to be operating.98 Because the degree of any in-
fringement of an actor's free will is necessarily measured against
the base line of the actor's rights and privileges under the law, it is
not surprising to find that conduct is usually considered coercive,
and the listener's free will infringed,9 7 only after a court has con-
cluded that the listener has a legally protectible interest in avoid-
ing the consequences threatened by the "coercing" party.98 Coer-
cion, then, is a label used to characterize the outcome of a
is used with impunity to cloak [their] opinions and predilections .... "); Hellerstein, supra
note 17, at 357-59 (in attempting to distinguish between "coercion" and "persuasion" courts
have "resorted to a procedure which should provide inviting material for the student of
language and symbolism"); Smith, Coercion of Third Parties in Labor Disputes: The Sec-
ondary Boycott, 1 LA. L. REv. 277, 279-80 (1939) ("coercion" of third party to labor dispute
distinguished from peaceful persuasion). In the 1950's, a second series of articles addressed
the persuasion-coercion distinction. See Jones, Picketing and Coercion: A Jurisprudence of
Epithets, 39 VA. L. REv. 1023 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Jones, Jurisprudence of Epithets]
(Court has equated picketing with "coercion" by focusing on "empty cash register" of pick-
eted party, rather than on viewer's response); Gregory, Picketing and Coercion: A Defense,
39 VA. L. REv. 1053 (1953) (states should be allowed to regulate picketing, which is eco-
nomic coercion "used in the competitive struggle for self-interest and gain"); Jones, Picket-
ing and Coercion: A Reply, 39 VA. L. Rv. 1063 (1953) (picketing is not synonymous with
"coercion"); Gregory, Picketing and Coercion: A Conclusion, 39 VA. L. Rv. 1067 (1953)
(picketing results in economic coercion, and should be declared illegal as such).
"F. HAInuN, supra note 16, at 212.
Cf. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Devine, 254 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Ky. 1953) ("[C]oercion"
exists when one individual induces another "to do or perform some act under circumstances
which deprive him of the exercise of his free will.") (emphasis added); Norton v. Michigan
State Highway Dep't, 315 Mich. 313, 319-20, 24 N.W.2d 132, 135 (1946) ("Coercion" that
invalidates a contract means the "application of such force ... as to constrain [a party] to
do against his will something he would not otherwise have done.") (emphasis added); First
State Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 174 Minn. 535, 537, 219 N.W. 908, 909 (1928) ('To
sustain an action for damages on the ground of coercion, there must be some wrongful or
unlawful act, acts or conduct on the part of the defendant sufficient to constrain the plain-
tiff, against his will, to do or refrain from doing something which he has a legal right to do
or refuse to do.") (emphasis added).
9 See, e.g., Berry Bros. Buick, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 257 F. Supp. 542, 546
(E.D. Pa. 1966) (reasonable demand by manufacturer on dealer to accept automobiles or
parts is not "coercion" within meaning of Automobile Dealers' Act, since manufacturer has
right to goad along an inefficient dealer); McKay v. Retail Auto. Salesmen's Local Union
1067, 16 Cal. 2d 311, 321, 106 P.2d 373, 379 (1940) ("[Coercion" of employer to yield to
employees' demands, out of fear that he will otherwise be unable to obtain suitable employ-
ees, "is not the kind of coercion of which courts can take notice."); Alfred W. Booth & Bro.
v. Burgess, 72 N.J. Eq. 181, 195, 65 A. 226, 232 (1906) ("Coercion which results ... from
the exercise of the absolute right to refrain from contracting, cannot possibly be a tort,
because it violates no legal right.").
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balancing of interests in a given situation, rather than a concept
with a precise and independent analytic content. 9
Because one central concern of the first amendment is to en-
sure the existence of a free market in ideas,100 the preliminary in-
quiry for determining whether a secondary boycott is predomi-
nantly coercive and hence unprotected by the first amendment
focuses on the reaction of the listeners to the boycott advocates'
message, 101 and not on the economic vulnerability of the secondary
party. At this stage of the analysis, the interests at stake in deter-
mining whether the speech is coercive are the listeners' and not the
secondary target's.1 02 In a typical secondary boycott, a boycott ad-
vocate's message is thrust into the marketplace of ideas, and the
boycott's success or lack thereof is linked to the persuasive appeal
of the advocate's position to the public generally. Only where the
listeners join in the boycott out of fear can the boycott properly be
held coercive for the purpose of deciding whether the speech is
protected.
Several first amendment decisions outside the boycott context
provide a framework for analyzing the coerciveness of the boycott
advocates' appeal. In Bridges v. California,0 5 the Court overturned
the contempt conviction of a labor leader who had published a
statement that enforcement of a judge's decree would result in a
statewide strike. The Court held that the message was not suffi-
" Oliver Wendell Holmes's observation in Privilege, Malice & Intent, 8 HARv. L. Rav.
1 (1894), where he discusses interference with contract, is apposite here. Holmes states that
a court's determination that a plaintiff has or lacks an interest is often largely a question of
policy, and that judges are
shy of reasoning [on] such grounds. Therefore, decisions for or against [a defendant's]
privilege [to inflict injury on the plaintiff], which really can stand only upon [policy]
grounds, often are presented as hollow deductions from empty general propositions
... or else are put as if they themselves embodied a postulate for the law and admit-
ted of no further deduction.
Id. at 3. The common law concept of "coercion," as applied to secondary boycotts, falls into
the latter category.
100 See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1926) (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ.,
concurring) (first amendment doctrine premised on notion that free discussion affords ade-
quate protection against erroneous ideas); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (central concern of first amendment is free trade in ideas).
101 See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 894-95, 922 (1982) (re-
jecting the lower court's finding that "many black persons ... were forced and compelled
against their personal wills to withhold ... trade" and then finding "ample support in the
record" to conclude that most witnesses voluntarily participated in the boycott).
102 See Note, Labor Picketing and Commercial Speech, supra note 6 at 952 (Court's
current illegal objective test fails to draw "the crucial distinction between the economic co-
ercion of the picketed business that may result if the listeners are persuaded by the mes-
sage, and the coercion of the listeners themselves").
16$ 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
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ciently threatening to have intimidated the state court judge,10'
and therefore involved no clear and present danger sufficient to
justify punishment.105 Quoting language from an earlier decision,
the Court found nothing in the labor leader's statement "which
would have affected a mind of reasonable fortitude."108 Similarly,
in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,107 the Court, in determining
whether or not certain "fighting words" were protected speech, fo-
cused on the reaction of the "average addressee" and not on the
intent of the speaker.108 Finally, in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 0 9
the Court took judicial notice of the "economic dependence of...
employees on their employers"11  in holding that an employer's
prediction of plant closing in the event of unionization was a
"threat of retaliation based on misrepresentation and coercion, and
as such without the protection of the First Amendment." ' 1
Together, Bridges, Chaplinsky, and Gissel Packing suggest
that of the three indicia of coercion in action-inducing speech-the
intent of the speaker, the actual words spoken, and the reaction of
the listeners" 2-it is the last that is the most important. In the
context of secondary boycotts, a test that focuses solely on the in-
tent of the speaker would improperly protect boycotts in which av-
erage listeners, misperceiving a boycott advocate's lack of intent to
carry out his threats, were led to participate in the boycott solely
because they feared sanctions from the boycott advocate if they
failed to participate. Conversely, a test that focuses on the boycott
advocate's actual words might lead to restricting boycotts in which
the speaker's words, taken literally, conveyed a threat but were not
so understood by average listeners. The Court's opinion in Clai-
borne Hardware illustrates the problem. Although one of the boy-
cott leaders had, on at least two occasions, threatened physical vio-
10 Id. at 278.
105 Id. at 262-63.
106 Id. at 278 (quoting Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402, 425 (1918)
(Holmes, J., dissenting)).
10- 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
108 Id. at 573.
1- 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
110 Id. at 617.
"I Id. at 618; see also id. at 619-20 (discussing how employees take hints of plant clos-
ings as coercive threats and not honest forecasts).
I" In Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969), the Court focused on all three of
these factors in holding that a young man's remark during a political rally that he wanted to
get then-President Lyndon Johnson "in [his] sights," id. at 706, was not an unlawful threat
on the President's life. The Court noted that the speaker had no intention of implementing
his threat, id. at 707-08, that the words themselves were mere political hyperbole, id., and
that "the crowd laughed after the statement was made," id. at 707.
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lence for noncompliance with the boycott,1 s the Court relied in its
decision on evidence that those individuals who participated in the
boycott did so not out of fear but because they believed in the
boycott's underlying purpose." 4
As in Claiborne, the key question in analyzing the coercive im-
pact of a secondary boycott must be whether "fear rather than
protected conduct [is] the dominant force" in the boycott's suc-
cess.1 5 In the past, commentators have attempted to answer this
question by differentiating between "signal picketing," in which a
union signals a large scale strike to union members and members
of affiliated unions, and "publicity picketing," in which a union
seeks to persuade the general public to adopt the union's view-
point." Adopting this distinction, courts have held illegal under
section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) those secondary boycotts in which a union's
speech is directed not toward the public, but toward other union
members. 117 Underlying this distinction is the notion that appeals
to join boycotts, when directed solely at other union members, rely
for their success not on persuasion but on the implicit threat that
economic sanctions, such as union fines, will be imposed on mem-
bers who do not toe the union line."8s
11 On April 19, 1969, Charles Evans "[s]tated that boycott violators would be 'disci-
plined' by their own people." Two days later he stated, " 'If we catch any of your sons in
any of their racist stores, we're gonna break your damn neck."' 458 U.S. at 902.
11" Id. at 904-05 n.37, 922, 923 n.63.
1"5 Id. at 934. Fear may be induced by threats that are either verbal or physical, actual
or implied. An implied threat, for example, may inhere in conduct or symbols alone.
16 E.g., Cox, Strikes, Picketing and the Constitution, 4 VAND. L. Rav. 574, 594 (1951);
see also NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union Local 1001 (Safeco), 447 U.S. 607, 619
(1980) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("The statutory ban in this case affects only that aspect of
the union's efforts to communicate its views that calls for an automatic response to a signal,
rather than a reasoned response to an idea."); T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION 445 (1970) ("Labor picketing... is applied by closely knit, powerful organiza-
tions .... A labor picket line is thus not so much a rational appeal to persuasion as a
signal for the application of immediate and enormous economic leverage.").
17 See e.g., NLRB v. Local 825, A, B, C, D, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 659 F.2d
379, 387 (3d Cir. 1981) ("signal picketing" defined as picketing directed to providing "a
signal to neutrals that sympathetic action on their part is desired" but its lawfulness left
undecided); International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers Local 433
v. NLRB, 598 F.2d 1154, 1158-60 (9th Cir. 1979) (evidence that boycott advocates spoke
with employees of neutral employers in an alleged effort to induce them to strike constitutes
substantial evidence that "signal picketing" had occurred); Hirsch v. Building & Constr.
Trades Council, 530 F.2d 298, 304 (3d Cir. 1976) (union's picketing of construction project
"designed to appeal to other organized labor groups to exert economic pressure on an em-
ployer," rather than to inform or advise the public, proscribed under § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)).
" See Cox, supra note 116, at 594 (discussing the disciplinary economic sanctions fac-
ing secondary employee union members who cross a picket line). But see Jones, Jurispru-
dence of Epithets, supra note 95, at 1043-44 (suggesting that union ability to impose eco-
nomic sanctions on union members cannot be presumed in all situations).
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While attention to the particular audience is crucial in deter-
mining whether appeals to join a boycott carry with them implicit
threats,119 a per se rule prohibiting labor secondary boycotts that
appeal not to the public but to other union members is likely to be
overbroad. A secondary boycott that instigates a sympathy strike
by the secondary target's employees should not be presumed to be
coercive. Nor should the fact that the boycott sparks a "reflexive"
rather than reasoned response be determinative of coercion, 120
since such a response may indicate natural empathy as easily as
coerced support. Rather, courts analyzing the coerciveness of a
boycott must, as did the Supreme Court in Claiborne Hardware,
look carefully at the context of the boycott, the actual words of
inducement, and, above all, the reaction of the listeners in deter-
mining whether the boycott advocates have used fear or persuasion
to garner support for their cause.
C. Balancing the Union's Interest in Free Speech Against the
Employer's Interest in Freedom from Economic Pressure
Once it has been determined that the speech aspect of a boy-
cott is predominantly persuasive, the boycotters' interest in ex-
pressing their views through withdrawing patronage from a pri-
mary or secondary party must be weighed against that party's
interest in remaining free from economic pressure. In the past,
courts have categorically equated this pressure with coercion and,
as a result, have denied first amendment protection to secondary
boycotts.1 21 This practice, however, confuses coercion of the boy-
cott advocate's "listeners" with the economic pressure that those
who heed the advocate's appeal and join the boycott subsequently
exert upon the secondary party.1 22 Assuming that the boycott ad-
vocates predominantly persuade rather than coerce their listeners,
and so do not deprive them of free will, any subsequent pressure
on the secondary party will be coercive only because of the volun-
tary actions of the listeners. It is analytically inaccurate to equate
speech that persuades its listeners to exert economic pressure on
1 For an example of the importance of determining the intended audience, see NLRB
v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 619-20 (gauging the reactions of employees to determine
whether employer's "prediction" of plant closing was an unlawful threat).
120 See NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union Local 1001 (Safeco), 447 U.S. 607, 619
(1980) (Stevens, J., concurring) (discussing reflexive nature of response to picketing as a
rationale for its regulation).
121 See, e.g., International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Intl, Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 226
(1982).
112 See supra note 102.
[51:811
Secondary Boycotts and the First Amendment
the secondary target with speech that is itself coercive, and hence
per se unprotected."' 3
Past judicial practice is unsound for a second reason. As was
noted above, "coercion" is little more than a label used by courts
to characterize conduct in which the interests of the coerced party
outweigh those of the coercing party.1 4 Where the interests of the
coercing party are protected by the first amendment, courts are
not free to invent their own calculus for balancing those interests
under the guise of deciding whether the conduct in question is co-
ercive: the Supreme Court has already provided that calculus in its
decision in United States v. O'Brien.12 5 The Court in O'Brien held
that "when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the
same course of conduct," a governmental regulation of the non-
speech element which incidentally restricts first amendment free-
doms may be justified only
if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if
the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged
first amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest.128
As noted earlier, all boycotts involve expressive conduct on the
part of the boycotters,127 and are therefore subject to the O'Brien
test. The government may thus regulate the boycotters' infliction
of concerted economic pressure if, but only if, that regulation is the
least restrictive means of furthering a substantial state interest
that is unrelated to the suppression of free expression. To deter-
mine whether and when the government has a substantial interest
in protecting the target of a secondary boycott, this section ex-
amines first, the nature of the interests of any party who is the
target of a boycott, and second, the degree to which the nature or
extent of those interests is different in a secondary boycott.
1. Primary Boycotts. Courts have held that a businessman has
no legally cognizable interest in preventing his customers from
withholding their patronage,1 28 and that an individual not bound
12' Note, Labor Picketing and Commercial Speech, supra note 6, at 952 (Court fails to
draw "crucial distinction" between coercion of picketed business and coercion of listener).
22' See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
115 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
1"6 Id. at 377.
127 See supra text accompanying notes 15-16, 86-87.
2 An early statement of the notion that a businessman's interest in his customers'
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by prior contractual obligations generally has a right to cease doing
business with another at will. 12 9 From this premise it is easy to
argue that a boycott by consumers of a particular business should
be protected under the first amendment. Any state interest in pro-
tecting a retailer's patronage would appear insufficient to satisfy
the O'Brien test. Indeed, in Claiborne Hardware, the Court explic-
itly held that citizens had a first amendment right to induce third
parties to withhold patronage for political reasons. 130 A denial of
the same protection to citizens who seek to induce third parties
not to deal with a boycott target for labor-related reasons would be
nothing short of content-based discrimination, an anathema to the
values at the core of the first amendment.3 1
Where a boycott advocate seeks not to induce the withholding
of patronage by customers but work stoppages by the boycott tar-
get's employees, the target's interest in both uninterrupted busi-
ness operations and unbroken labor contracts may weigh substan-
tially more heavily against the boycott advocate's first amendment
interest in the balance mandated by O'Brien. Similarly, secondary
picketing might be unprotected when a union, advancing its own
organizational or recognitional objectives, pickets a secondary em-
ployer primarily to pressure him into boycotting a primary em-
ployer who employs nonunion labor or the labor of a different
union."3 2 In this situation, the O'Brien balance may weigh in favor
continued patronage is legally unprotected may be found in Mogul S.S. Co. v. McGregor, 23
Q.B.D. 598 (1889), aff'd, 1892 A.C. 25, 36-37, where the court held that traders who lost
patrons when a group of rival traders reduced its prices to the public had no protected
interest in retaining customers, and thus had suffered no legal injury. The Mogul analysis
was adopted by Holmes in Privilege, Malice & Intent, where he suggests that our legal
doctrines are based on the economic postulate of free competition, and that under this pos-
tulate, American courts have recognized a consumer's privilege, absent malicious intent,
both to form and to abstain from forming contracts with another party. Holmes, supra note
99, at 3.
"I See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919) (holding that the Sher-
man Act "does not restrict the long recognized right of trader or manufacturer ... freely to
exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal"); Rohm &
Haas Co. v. Dawson Chemical Co., 557 F. Supp. 739, 844 (S.D. Tex. 1983) ("It is a general
characteristic of free enterprise that a trader or manufacturer has the right to exercise his
discretion in choosing with whom he will conduct business."); McGee v. Collins, 156 La. 291,
305, 100 So. 430, 435 (1924) ("An individual, regardless of motive, has an absolute right to
refuse to deal with another.").
130 458 U.S. at 909.
1'1 For a persuasive argument that the Court's distinction between public issues and
labor issues in picketing cases constitutes a content-based discrimination, see Note, Labor
Picketing and Commercial Speech, supra note 6, at 947-49. Ordinarily, content-based re-
strictions on freedom of speech are subject to strict judicial scrutiny. See Stone, Content
Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 189 passim (1983).
132 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (1982) suggests this result. Under this statutory provision, a
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of protecting the primary employees' free choice in not unionizing,
or in selecting their own bargaining representative without
interference.
2. Secondary Boycotts. The state or federal interest in "shield-
ing unoffending employers and others from pressures in controver-
sies not their own"1 has frequently been cited to justify state re-
strictions on secondary boycotts that would be impermissible if
imposed on primary boycotts."" Under current law, a union has a
legitimate interest in bringing economic pressure to bear against a
primary employer with whom it has a dispute,135 but may not co-
erce a "neutral" party into joining the fray through activities that
threaten him with "substantial loss." 136 This judicial approach sug-
gests that the O'Brien test, when applied to secondary boycotts,
should focus on the definitions of "neutrality" and "substantial
loss" to ensure that alleged restrictions on the first amendment
freedoms associated with boycotting serve substantial state inter-
ests and are no more restrictive than necessary to further those
interests. This section argues that the interests of the secondary
target, and hence of the state, are a function of both the target's
neutrality and the substantiality of its threatened loss: the degree
of economic harm a secondary target may suffer before the state's
interests are substantial enough to justify incidental restrictions on
first amendment freedoms should be determined by the extent to
which the target is neutral.3 "
labor union may not "restrain or coerce. . . employees in the exercise" of their associational
rights. This section is limited, however, by the proviso in § 158(b)(7)(C) (1982), which states
that when organizational or recognitional picketing is "for the purpose of truthfully advising
the public. . . that an employer does not employ members of, or have a contract with, a
labor organization," the picketing is not illegal unless it interferes with deliveries or services
by third parties.
23 NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692 (1951).
1" See, e.g., International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 225
(1982) (secondary boycott provision drafted to protect neutral parties from quarrels not
their own); Safeco, 447 U.S. 607, 617-18 (1980) (§ 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) represents Congress's
"'striking of the delicate balance between union freedom of expression and the ability of
neutral employers, employees and consumers to remain free from coerced participation in
industrial strife' ").
"I See R. DmERSHINSKY, A. BERKOWrrz & P. MIsCIMAR, supra note 22, at 1.
1" Cf. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 912 ("Secondary boycotts and picketing by
labor unions may be prohibited, as part of 'Congress' striking of the delicate balance be-
tween union freedom of expression and the ability of neutral employers, employees, and
consumers to remain free from coerced participation in industrial strife.' ") (quoting Safeco,
447 U.S. at 617-618 (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
137 Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) seems to have been drafted with such a balancing test in
mind. Because § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) permits coercive boycotts of primary targets but only the
peaceful publicizing of disputes with the primary target to a secondary target's customers, a
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Because the secondary boycott statute protects only disinter-
ested parties, 138 the NLRB, the federal judiciary, and state courts
have developed various doctrines to sanction secondary boycotts
directed at companies that have accepted work that the struck em-
ployer has farmed out139 or companies that are owned or controlled
by the primary employer and are part of an integrated opera-
tion.140 A secondary target who fits one of these descriptions is not
deemed to be neutral to the primary target's labor dispute, but is
instead considered an "ally" of the primary target.1 41
Under current law, the "ally" doctrine developed under sec-
tion 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) protects secondary targets who are economically
interdependent with the primary target but are nonetheless neu-
tral to the primary target's labor dispute. 42 When viewed in con-
junction with the "ruin or substantial" loss test of NLRB v. Retail
Store Employees Union Local 1001 (Safeco),1 43 this doctrine leads
to rather arbitrary results. As discussed earlier, Safeco held that
secondary site picketing directed solely at the struck product is co-
ercive within the meaning of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) if it threatens
the secondary target with "ruin or substantial loss. '144 Under this
test, the ability of a labor group to publicize its dispute to the con-
suming public depends ultimately and arbitrarily on the primary
target's marketing and distribution methods, and, in particular, on
whether the primary target markets its products through non-
specialty stores or through franchises that sell few if any other
products. For example, Safeco would permit secondary picketing
of a grocery store selling the fruit of the primary target, but not of
a fruit stand selling primarily or only such fruit, even if the latter
would be a more effective forum for publicizing the primary dis-
court deciding the legality of a boycott of a secondary target that is economically interde-
pendent with the primary target must decide whether the degree of threatened loss to the
secondary target predominates over the degree of interdependence with the primary target.
If the loss predominates, then the boycott most closely resembles the coercive boycotting of
a neutral secondary target, which the statute forbids; if the interdependence predominates,
then the boycott more closely resembles a boycott of the primary target, which is permitted.
138 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
239 See, e.g., Douds v. Metropolitan Fed'n of Architects Local 231, 75 F. Supp. 672, 676-
77 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). See generally R. DERESmNSKY, A. BERKOWrrZ & P. MISCIMARRA, supra
note 22, at 122-56.
140 See R. DEREsnNsKy, A. BERKOWITZ & P. MIsOIIMARRA, supra note 22, at 156-80.
141 Id. at 121.
I'l Id. at 165 n.149 (noting that the NLRB "has stated continuously that it will not
predicate loss of neutral status on economic interdependency alone, absent common owner-
ship or control").
143 447 U.S. 607, 614-15 (1980).
244 See supra text accompanying notes 65-68.
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pute. Similarly, Chrysler employees would be unable to engage in a
secondary boycott of Chrysler's independent distributors, since,
generally, they sell only Chrysler cars, but employees who aid in
producing products generally sold in dime stores would be able to
picket secondary retailers. The rights of employees and unions to
publicize disputes should not so depend on the vagaries of the pri-
mary target's marketing methods.
A better result may be reached by taking the unity of eco-
nomic interest 1 5 between the secondary and primary targets into
account in assessing the extent of loss that will justify the state's
regulation of the boycott under O'Brien. As noted by the Supreme
Court in NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760 (Tree
Fruits), " only when the union creates a dispute with the secon-
dary employer that is separate from its dispute with the primary
employer do the congressional concerns of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)
come into play.14 The Safeco plurality inferred such a "separate
dispute" to exist whenever the economic effect of the secondary
picketing "reasonably can be expected" to be coercive. 14 This con-
clusion, however, effectively ignores the fact that even primary
boycotts, if successful, will induce secondary parties who were eco-
nomically dependent on the primary party to trade elsewhere. For
example, the coercive effects in Safeco would have been no differ-
ent had the union successfully publicized its dispute through pick-
eting at the primary site.
By merging the concepts of neutrality and substantial loss to
proscribe only threats disproportionate to the secondary target's
common economic interest with the primary target, the present
test would ensure that courts not confuse what are essentially the
secondary effects of a primary dispute with an unlawful "secon-
dary" dispute. Such a test would avoid arbitrary results currently
possible under Safeco and would preserve the O'Brien requirement
that incidental restrictions on speech through regulations of ex-
1' The courts of New York, in interpreting that state's labor laws, have used the term
"unity of interest" as a catch phrase in determining when a union "may follow the nonunion
goods and seek by peaceful picketing to persuade the consuming public to refrain from
purchasing the nonunion product, whether ... at the plant of the manufacturer or at the
store of the retailer in the same line of business and in unity of interest with the manufac-
turer." Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N.Y. 281, 286, 11 N.E.2d 910, 913 (1937); accord Empire
Smokes, Inc. v. Finch, 3 A.D.2d 503, 506, 162 N.Y.S.2d 329 (1957).
146 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
247 Id. at 72.
" Safeco, 447 U.S. at 614.
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pressive conduct be no more restrictive than necessary to serve a
substantial state interest.
C. Secondary Neutrality in Political Boycotts
In a political secondary boycott, where the boycott advocates
put economic pressure on third parties to further their goals of fos-
tering political change, the second level of compulsion is not eco-
nomic but political. Therefore, the assessment of neutrality that
O'Brien requires in weighing the state interest at stake must focus
on whether the primary and secondary targets are in unity of po-
litical interest. In a democratic republic, the state or federal legis-
lature (the primary target in a political secondary boycott) is con-
sidered the "agent" or alter ego of its constituency (the secondary
target).1 49 Under this structural view of government, citizens of a
municipality, state, or nation are by definition in unity of political
interest with their legislatures and hence will almost never be
neutral.
This structural view was implicitly adopted in both Claiborne
Hardware and Missouri v. National Organization of Women. 50
The courts in both cases held the political boycott to be constitu-
tionally protected as a petitioning of the government for a redress
of grievances despite the extension of the boycott to secondary
targets. In neither case did the court inquire into the individual
political views of the merchants against whom the boycott was di-
rected. Instead, the courts implicitly treated the boycott as pri-
mary, not secondary, in nature. Both Claiborne Hardware and
Missouri v. National Organization of Women thus suggest that
citizens of a given political community cannot claim neutrality in
relation to their government, and therefore cannot invoke any sub-
stantial state interest, overriding the first amendment interests of
the political boycotters, to protect themselves from economic
harm.
CONCLUSION
This comment has argued that current first amendment doc-
trine provides a comprehensive framework for analyzing all sec-
ondary boycott cases. In delineating this framework, the comment
"'9 See THE FEDERALIST No. 14, at 100 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) ("It is in a
democracy that the people meet and exercise the government in person; in a republic they
assemble and administer it by their representatives and agents.").
1- 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980).
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has identified two basic steps for discovering the first amendment
status of a given secondary boycott: first, is the boycott advocate's
"message" persuasive, and hence protected by the first amend-
ment, or coercive, and hence entirely outside the first amendment's
protection; and second, if the boycott advocate's message is per-
suasive, to what extent is regulation of the boycott nonetheless jus-
tified under United States v. O'Brien as an incidental restriction
on speech necessary to further substantial state interests. The
comment has argued that, in answering this second question, the
proper analysis under O'Brien should focus on the extent to which
the secondary target shares an economic interest, or, in the case of
political boycotts, a political interest, with the primary target. The
comment concludes by arguing that, in a democracy, the secondary
target in a political secondary boycott almost always will share a
political interest with the primary target and thus can almost
never claim "neutrality." Thus, the distinctions in the results that
the Supreme Court has reached in assessing the legality of labor
and political boycotts may be justified under a single framework,
rather than viewed as questionable content-based discrimination.
Barbara J. Anderson
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